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Camps, whether created by or for refugees, undocumented migrants or ‘war on terror’ 
suspects, form a central mechanism by which modern societies and territories are 
managed. While most of us live in permanent built environments which create the 
stable and predictable settings for our mundane activities, other people are ruptured 
from such a prosaic reality, living in a situation which is transient and ephemeral. 
Camps are an inseparable part of this reality of displacement and movement, 
detention, asylum and refuge. These spaces are often created ad hoc due to an urgent 
need and later are frequently suspended in time with no clear future, separated from 
their social, cultural and spatial surroundings. 
While detention, transit and refugee camps differ substantially in terms of their 
functions, conditions and modes of creation and organisation, they are all recognised 
as various forms of the same ever-present mechanism of modernity that is still an 
important aspect of how we live today. Over the last decade, much has been written 
about the ‘return of the camp’,1 mainly in relation to the camps of the US ‘war on 
terror’2 and the global proliferation of the camps which form part of the current 
‘migration age’.3 Yet the camp has never disappeared since its first emergence in the 
colonies as early as the 19th century4 and its extensive use during the 20th century, 
which will be remembered, as stated famously by Zygmunt Bauman, as the ‘Century 
of Camps’.5 In Israel-Palestine, the camp was and still is prevalently used to facilitate 
the significant geopolitical changes of the last century related to the Israeli nation-
building process and the mass displacement it caused.6  
Camps are extensively employed by both authoritarian regimes and contemporary 
democracies as instruments of control, custody, care and abandonment. As such, they 
are mainly analysed as ‘devices of power’, created by, and mostly for, stripped 
populations which are managed outside society and the normal state apparatuses in 
order to maintain the ‘national order of things’.7 However, the camp is not only a 
space for powerless people: while many camps are indeed inhabited by weak 
populations excluded by strong powers, others are used by the strong to gain and 
 2 
extend control over desired territories. In addition, camp spaces are sometimes used 
by their residents as platforms for their ongoing spatial-political struggles.  
‘The Common Camp’ is a term which pulls the camp out of its marginal position, 
establishing it as a ‘common’ space standing at the centre of the way the modern state 
is organised. The camp is ‘common’ as a prevalent space; it is common in the sense 
that it is widespread despite efforts to make it invisible. In Israel-Palestine’s ongoing 
state of exception, the camp is indeed so common as to almost become an ordinary, 
typical space.8 The camp is also ‘common’ in the sense of being a joint phenomenon 
which influences many, a sort of a spatial ‘common denominator’ that links between 
varied ethnic groups and political actions. While the meaning of the word ‘camp’ 
itself indicates separation, the fact that it is used by or for so many groups of 
population makes it in some sense a ‘common ground’ of separation and exclusion – 
either generated from within or from the outside – which is common to all. This term 
could be looked at as the other side of the Hobbessian Commonwealth:9 while 
Hobbes’s term means a political organisation of people under one sovereign, ‘The 
Common Camp’ implies the social and political separation and exclusion frequently 
imposed by the state. The various types of camps created over the years in Israel-
Palestine will enable the spatial vocabulary of the camp to be redefined and 
conceptualised and allow light to be shed on the global phenomenon of camp spaces, 
the current proliferation of which makes the subject both relevant and urgent. 
‘Today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical 
paradigm of the West’10 states provocatively the Italian philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben, whose influential theory brought the idea of ‘the camp’ to the frontline of 
academic research and was also one of the generators of this research. Agamben’s 
theory of sovereign power and the state/space of exception,11 presented particularly in 
his book Homo Sacer – Sovereign Power and Bare Life, places the camp at the centre 
of modern (bio)politics together with the figure of homo sacer – a person denied all 
rights and banned from society, ‘bare life’ stripped of any human and political 
existence. Following Arendt’s and Foucault’s ideas on modern society and 
biopolitics,12 Schmitt’s theory of the sovereign and the exception13 and Benjamin’s 
observation on the ‘state of emergency’ becoming the rule,14 Agamben sees the 
foundation of the modern political order in the incorporation of bare biological life 
into the political realm by its exclusion in the camp. The Nazi concentration and 
extermination camps are Agamben’s core example of the thanatopolitical space of the 
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camp, however as the fundamental (although not the only) ‘space of exception’, the 
‘essence’ of the camp is present each time the structure of the exception appears.15 
Camps are created whenever the central nexus of the modern nation-state – land, the 
state and the nation – enters into a crisis,16 whenever there is a gap between the 
‘territorial container’ of the state and the ‘nation’ inhabiting it.17 
Scholars who study the camp relate to Agamben’s theory in quite different ways.18 
Some, such as Claudio Minca, who writes extensively on the spatialities, topologies 
and geographies of the camp and its pivotal role in modern biopolitics, follow 
Agamben’s line of thinking and use it as a platform to further investigate the camp 
theoretically.19 Richard Ek traces the genealogy of Agamben’s philosophy, examining 
its useful applications in both analysing camps of intensified sovereign powers and 
examining metaphoric ‘spaces of exception’.20 The theory is indeed adopted by 
scholars who analyse camps as spaces where ‘bare life’ is produced, such as Jenny 
Edkins, who analyses famine-relief camps in Africa, NATO refugee camps in 
Macedonia established during the Kosovo conflict21 and the Woomera detention camp 
Australia, where, together with Pin-Fat, she looks at lip-sewing among refugees as a 
practice of ‘bare life’.22  
However, closer to the approach taken for this research, some scholars also use 
Agamben’s theory in a more critical manner, carefully identifying and highlighting its 
various problems. In his examination of terrorist training camps, Stuart Elden argues 
that in utilising Agamben’s theoretical model it is always essential to interrogate the 
particularities of a specific situation and question whether the model is appropriate.23 
In his work on the US camps in Guantánamo Bay, Derek Gregory criticises 
Agamben’s theoretical nation-state container model, arguing that the transnational 
spatialities of the ‘war on terror’ goes beyond the frame of a single state.24 Due to 
complex and changing territorialities and sovereignties in Israel-Palestine over the last 
century and the multiple camp types identified there, the Agambenian theory also 
appears too rigid and reductive. 
Another critical perspective highly relevant to this work is promoted by an increasing 
number of scholars who, similarly to this research, analyse particular camps as 
complex spatial and political phenomena, arguing that Agamben’s line of thinking 
leads us away from a critical and dynamic account of power relations in the camp. 
Alongside scholars such as William Walters, Patricia Owens, Kim Rygiel, Romola 
Sanyal, Nando Sigona and Adam Ramadan,25 who argue that Agamben’s perspective 
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offers little space to register the social and political agency of people in the camp, this 
research examines the camp as a concrete phenomenon and takes into account how 
politics is re-articulated there. The camp will be looked at as first and foremost a 
space of modernity, according to what Zygmunt Bauman suggests as the essence of 
modernity itself – the struggle for order against chaos.26 However Michel de 
Certeau’s writings on the power of the practices of everyday life,27 and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conceptualisation of ‘becoming minor’ as a way the architecture of the 
majority is manipulated to create ‘lines of escape’ from it,28 will form the theoretical 
basis for analysing the camp as a political space in itself.29  
As there is no theory which conceptualises the camp in a manner that includes its 
concrete multiple forms and functions,30 the this research defines the camp by 
identifying distinct characteristics common to all its types that will allow them to be 
discussed as one spatio-political entity. This definition is based on three main 
characteristics: the camp is first and foremost a temporary space, although it 
sometimes becomes an enduring temporariness;31 it is managed under a particular 
mode of governance and legal order; and it is a space created by or for populations 
with a distinct ethnic, cultural, political or other specific identity. These characteristics 
are common to all the camps that will be explored in this research and also relate to 
the basic Agambenian nexus of the nation-state – territory (land), order/governance 
(state) and population (nation).32 The device of the camp, which is always related to 
mobility and its containment, may vanish or change significantly after a short period 
of time. The geopolitical transformations it supports, however, are often irreversible. 
While defining the camp entails understanding its various manifestations as one 
spatio-political mechanism, this research also seeks to understand these differences 
and their meanings. As suggested by Elden,33 this investigation will be based on the 
particularities of specific situations and their individual geopolitical and historical 
conditions. 
The Common Camp in Israel-Palestine  
Camps and temporary settlements are a prevalent phenomenon in Israel-Palestine. 
Erected ad hoc, for various reasons, by and for different populations and actors in 
varied shapes and forms, some are rigidly organised spaces of ‘total order’, while 
others look like chaotic spaces with no identifiable organising principles. However, 
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the continuous appearance of these camps over the last century in this territory 
requires further explanation of a situation of which temporariness is a consistent 
feature. The Palestinian refugee camps erected following the 1948 war which still 
exist today are probably the best known, yet many other camp types can be identified 
within these boundaries. The study of camps in Israel-Palestine seeks to explore the 
camp as an architectural instrument used to manipulate both land and population in 
order to pursue political interests. This would also allow a crucial aspect of the way 
the territory was and still is managed, organised and negotiated by the state and by the 
local populations inhabiting it to be revealed.    
The appearance of camps in Israel-Palestine is closely connected to the discrepancy 
between Israel’s territorial and ethnic boundaries, as well as to its emergence as a 
modern state for the Jewish people on a territory which was mainly inhabited by Arab 
populations. Many of these camps form part of the indefatigable efforts of the Zionist 
movement, followed by the Israeli state, to establish Jewish domination over the 
territory while destabilising the Arab presence and reducing it to a minimum. The 
scope of this phenomenon and its particular manifestations show that these camps are 
not only related to the ‘purification’ of the population by the production of ‘bare life’. 
Rather, they are mainly connected to Israel’s ongoing drastic geopolitical 
reformations, the related continuous ‘state of emergency’ of which is tightly bound to 
what seems to be an everlasting ‘emergence of state’.34 
At the beginning of the 20th century, tent camps were erected by ‘pioneer’ Zionist 
settlers in remote frontier areas [Illustration 1]. Under British rule (1917–1948)35 
fortified camps were created by Zionist settlers [Illustration 2] in order to expand the 
territory of a possible future state, while detention camps were constructed by British 
authorities to prevent illegal Jewish immigrants/refugees from entering the country 
[Illustration 3]. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Palestinian refugee camps were 
erected in neighbouring Arab countries, while makeshift camps were also created 
within Israel’s 1948 boundaries by internally displaced Palestinian and Bedouin 
populations. In the same time, other camps were created by the new Israeli state in 
order to absorb and later spread the waves of Jewish immigrants entering the country. 
As the geopolitical map changed, new camps appeared; after the 1967 war, Jewish 
settler outpost camps were erected in the occupied territories, and later an internment 
camp was opened to confine the Palestinian population participating in the first 
uprising against Israel (the first intifada). During the 1990s, a second generation of 
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immigrant camps appeared in peripheral areas to accommodate the new wave of mass 
immigration arriving from the former USSR and Ethiopia. In 2005, camps were 
constructed to temporarily house the Israeli settlers evicted from the Gaza Strip. Most 
recently, in 2013, a Palestinian protest camp was erected (and rapidly destroyed) in 
the E1 zone, and later that year a detention camp for African asylum seekers was 
opened in the Negev desert.  
This brief list of examples demonstrates that while these spaces differ significantly in 
their political objectives and spatial forms, it seems that the reliance on camps is a 
central paradigm in the way space and populations in the region are managed. What is 
common to all of these camps? What do their differences mean? And finally, why are 
they so prevalent in Israel-Palestine? This research attempts to answer these questions 
while advancing the understanding of the camp itself as a versatile spatio-political 
mechanism.  
Israel is an important example of the nationalist creation and territorial re-definition of 
states in the 19th and 20th centuries, using different techniques to manage and 
reorganise populations in space. The vast mosaic of camps in Israel-Palestine is 
grounded in the particular history and character of the radical geopolitical changes 
this territory has undergone over the last century. These changes were not a 
consequence of arbitrary or uncontrollable events; rather, they were part of a political 
idea which turned into a national movement, then into a grand plan which was 
eventually turned into an ongoing national project – the Zionist project, the goal of 
which was to make historic Palestine, or in the Jewish ‘geotheological’ term Eretz 
Yisrael (the land of Israel),36 the national home for the Jewish people. When this 
project began to develop in the late 19th century, the territory was mainly inhabited 
by Arab populations,37 and camps were one of the primary means to both change this 
reality and deal with these radical alternations. Similarly to other encompassing state 
projects of social engineering and territorial ordering,38 the Zionist project also 
includes a utopian vision accompanied by a high modernist ideology, which in the 
case of Zionism was supplemented by ‘modern messianism’,39 a messianic spirit 
which was appropriated to achieve national goals.40 In addition, it is crucial to 
understand Israel in relation to ‘settler societies’41 as a form of colonialism, a form 
which in the Zionist context is described as colonisation for ethnic-survival.42   
The initial approach and actions of the Zionist settler society and its national 
modernist ideology, which used camps from its earliest stages, could be already 
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identified in the early pre-state period, mainly in the Zionist territorial expansion to 
‘the frontier’, the ‘taming’ and settling of which was a central icon in Zionist 
discourse.43 The camp was initially adopted during the first and second Aliyah44 
waves (although mainly in the second), when temporary tent-camps were used by 
idealist Zionist ‘pioneers’ who settled in remote, desolate frontier areas as part of the 
effort to ‘build the country’ and cultivate the land45 and thus spread across the 
territory.46 As Boaz Neuman shows, this was also accompanied by real passion for the 
traditional Jewish ‘promised land’.47 The best known type of such camps were the 
pre-fabricated ‘Tower and Stockade’ fortified camps,48 of which over fifty were 
erected in frontier territories during the years of the Arab revolt.49 These settler camps 
were a crucial instrument for extending the boundaries of the future state: ‘There is 
only one thing we can do in the current circumstances – to change the map of the land 
of Israel by establishing new [settlement] points50 [...] Our role now is to grab and 
settle,’51 stated a leader of the Jewish Agency just before the first partition plan was 
published in 1937.52 These camps were the first demonstration of both the modernist 
Zionist attitude to the land and the modernist mechanism for fulfilling it: the land 
needed to be ‘tamed’, conquered and controlled in order to turn it into a resource and 
a territory; the camp was the rapidly-erected modern territorial instrument which 
enabled this goal to be achieved. Similarly to other camps for civilians, settler camps 
are also deeply rooted in colonial history, evidence for which can also be found in 
Australia, South America and South Africa; this enables this specific example to be 
placed in the wider context of settler societies. 
In this context it is worth mentioning that while this form of settlement was supported 
by the British authorities at the beginning of the British Mandate,53 their attitude 
changed drastically during the Arab revolt, when strict limitations on Jewish 
immigration to Palestine were enforced through detention camps to which illegal 
Jewish immigrants and refugees were deported.54 This was an additional type of camp 
which appeared in the area during that period, similar to other examples of internment 
camps in colonial history. 
However, it is only by looking at the period after the establishment of Israel in 1948 
that we can see how the camp was widely adopted as a multifaceted mechanism to 
manage and re-organise the Jewish and Arab populations within and outside the 
territory. While the pre-state settler camps had a mainly territorial meaning, the 
intensified role of the camp during the first years of statehood was more complex, as 
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it was used for two complementary spatial-political purposes. First, it was a territorial 
mechanism which allowed one population to spread while concentrating and 
suspending another. Second, it was a mechanism which enabled the implementation 
of a modernist ideology of creating a planned new order and reducing what was 
perceived as undesirable chaos.  
Camps, created and managed by the Jewish Agency and the state, were used to absorb 
and then spread mass Jewish immigration, which in Israel’s first three years doubled 
the size of the Jewish population to 1.2 million [Illustration 4]. This immigration 
came from two main sources. First, the European Jewry who had survived the war, 
many having lost their homes, were suspended in Displaced Persons or transit camps, 
waiting for the gates of the country to open after the closure imposed by the British 
authorities.55 Second, Jews from Arab countries wished to come to Israel because of 
religious aspirations, feared violence due to the Arab-Israeli war or were approached 
by Zionist emissaries who enticed them to leave their homes and settle in the new 
state.  
The first camps in Israel were the closed ‘immigrant camps’ established in the 
abandoned British military camps [Illustrations 5-6], followed by smaller immigrant 
transit camps – the ma’abara56 – which were constructed across the country including 
in frontier areas, and were composed of pre-fabricated units placed in a rigid, efficient 
order [Illustrations 7-8]. Camps were also created abroad by Jewish institutions such 
as the ‘Joint’57 in order to gather together Jewish immigrants before transferring them 
to their new state in boats and aeroplanes [Illustrations 9-10].58 This immigrant transit 
camp project and the modern frontier development towns that followed have 
generated an internal Jewish ethnic division in Israel based on territorial ordering: 
while the founding group of European Jews (Ashkenazim) tightened its hold on the 
upper social spheres, the Eastern Jews (Mizrahim), who came later from Muslim 
countries, were marginalised on the state’s periphery.59 
The distorted mirror image of these camps are the Palestinian refugee camps created 
by UNRWA in neighbouring Arab countries for those who fled or were forced out 
during the 1948 and 1967 wars. These camps appeared in the same years as the Israeli 
immigrant camps and supported a population of about the same size [Illustrations 11-
12].60 However, while the Jewish migrant camps were liquidated after a few years and 
many of their dwellers were moved into the government-planned frontier 
development towns, the Palestinian camps still exist today. Camps were also used by 
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the Israeli army to detain thousands of Palestinian civilians during the 1948 war.61 In 
addition, makeshift camps were created within the post-1948 Israeli territories by the 
internally displaced Palestinian and Bedouin populations. Over the years, these 
makeshift camps have become unrecognised settlements where the Palestinian and 
Bedouin populations were suspended for decades with no basic infrastructure or state 
services. Many Negev Bedouins are suspended in these temporary conditions to this 
day.62 
There is still no academic research which analyses camps and temporary settlements 
as a prevalent phenomenon in Israel-Palestine and hence there is still no work which 
compares these different camp types and analyses their meaning. The ethnically 
oriented spatial policies in Israel-Palestine, including the different camps, have indeed 
been examined by numerous scholars, however most analysis has been in relation to 
specific spaces, populations and periods,63 and not in terms of the phenomenon of the 
camp itself. Other scholars have identified Israel’s ethnocratic spatial and geopolitical 
patterns as an ongoing national regime which crosses spaces and periods,64 yet the 
wider role of the camp as a versatile spatio-political tool in the territory has not yet 
been examined.  
We begin to see the complexity of the situation of camps in Israel-Palestine. While all 
these camps possess the same characteristics defined earlier, they differ substantially. 
They were created in many forms, either from modern pre-fabricated temporary units 
or as makeshift camps; they were made by and for different populations and actors; 
they existed for different periods of time, either for a few years or until today; and 
they served different purposes, either to spread the Jewish population over the 
territory or to concentrate and suspend the Arab populations within or outside the 
territory. These differences are much more complicated and less binary than what is 
presented here, but the basic characteristics noted here are required for an initial 
understanding of the situation. 
While there was first a need to establish the common characteristics for these camps 
in order to discuss them as one spatial phenomenon, the additional effort, which is the 
other central endeavour of this research, is to explore the meaning of the differences 
between these camps in order to understand how they were and still are used 
differently as a determining factor in the continuing rearrangement of the territory. 
These differences help the argument in two ways: they will allow me to assert that the 
multifaceted instrument of the camp is a prevalent part of space in Israel-Palestine, 
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encompassing various types, populations and purposes; and they will also allow me to 
explore the meaning of the camp as a versatile spatial instrument, and thus go beyond 
its general conceptualisation. 
Accordingly, the research focuses on two different camps in Israel, located in the 
southern Negev desert [Illustration 13]: Yeruham – created in the early 1950s as a 
ma’abara – a Jewish immigrant transit camp – and eventually converted into a 
development town, and the neighbouring Rachme, a Bedouin ‘unrecognised village’, 
created in the late 1950s as a makeshift camp by the indigenous population following 
their forced relocation by the Israeli army, which is now struggling for government 
recognition. It is important to stress that the research is not about what Yeruham is 
like today, but about the camps which were an inseparable part of its establishment 
and growth; Rachme, on the other hand, is studied as a current, ongoing camp 
situation. Yeruham and Rachme are two very different examples of the camp on 
various levels despite their close geographic location. The differences include the 
reasons for their creation, their spatial formation, their population and the duration of 
their existence. Yeruham, similarly to other ma’abara camps across the country, was 
created by the Israeli government and the Jewish Agency in order to rapidly absorb 
Jewish immigrants and spread them to frontier areas, and was liquidated when the 
permanent development town was constructed.65  In contrast, Rachme was created by 
the displaced Bedouins themselves and developed according to the control and 
management policies of the Israeli government, which have suspended its residents in 
a temporary condition until today.  
It is important again to emphasise that Yeruham and Rachme were not chosen for this 
research as mere ‘test cases’ used to prove the main argument about the camp being a 
prevalent spatio-political instrument in the region and show how it is translated into 
reality in Israeli space. Rather, these particular camps were selected because of their 
many diverse aspects, as well as because of their similarities. They are similar not 
only because the basic mechanism of the camp can be identified in both of them, but 
also because they are both frontier camps established as part of the territorial actions 
of the early years of statehood, when weak populations were excluded and 
manipulated by the state in various ways. Yeruham and Rachme’s similar timelines, 
their shared geographical location, the fact that they were both created as a result of 
forceful settlement of vulnerable populations and the way the legacy of the camp is 
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still part of their present at various levels allows the camp to be studied in two 
complementary manners.  
Expanding and holding: Yeruham and the ma’abarot transit camps  
Established in January 1951 as a ma’abara transit camp by the Jewish Agency, 
Yeruham [Illustrations 14-16] was formed with the intention to create ‘a city in the 
Negev, in the desert, in a desolate area which creates passage for infiltrators and 
smugglers from the Gaza Strip to Jordan’.66 This was the way in which Giora 
Yoseftal, the head of the Absorption Department in the Jewish Agency presented the 
reason for its establishment to Rudy Kleiner, a young Kibbutz member who 
volunteered for the task of creating and managing Yeruham camp. Stated less than 
two years after the Negev was fully conquered by Israel in March 1949, this quote 
indicates the unstable territorial situation in the state’s first years. The Negev desert, 
which covers sixty percent of Israel’s territory, is a frontier area which was almost 
unsettled by the Zionist movement before statehood due to the difficult climatic 
conditions; the strategic need to access the Red Sea created the Israeli interest to 
conquer and settle it. Before Israel was established, the Negev was mostly inhabited 
by Bedouin tribes that spread beyond the borders with Jordan and Egypt. The 
description of the Bedouins as ‘infiltrators’ reflects the post-war Emergency 
Regulations in Israel, designed to firmly control the movement of Arab populations to 
and within the state’s territories. 67  
The ma’abara transit camps were erected in order to temporarily absorb the Jewish 
immigrants who came to Israel during the ‘mass immigration’ period (1948-1951), 
and to spread them across the country. Mass immigration was perceived as a 
necessary means of securing Israel’s military achievements, as David Ben-Gurion, 
Israel’s founding father and the Prime Minister in the state’s first year, has stated: ‘we 
have conquered territories, but without settlements they have no decisive value... 
Settlements – that is the real conquest! The future of the state depends on 
immigration’.68 By 1952, more than 257,000 people – a sixth of Israel’s population – 
lived in 129 ma’abara camps which about half of them constructed in remote frontier 
territories.69  
‘There was nothing there’, wrote Rudy in his diary, after allocating an appropriate 
location for Yeruham camp; ‘not a path, nor a paved road, nothing. Only one water 
hole which is called by the Arabs Bir Rachme’.70 The Israeli army assigned a military 
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reserve force to guard the ma’abara, and the establishment of the camp was 
enthusiastically described as a quasi military operation: ‘in a speed of the ‘Tower and 
Stockade’ days, the new ma’abara in Tel-Yeruham was erected’.71  
The first inhabitants in the camp were Jewish immigrants from Romania and the later 
mostly arrived from Asia and North Africa. Similar to other Mizrahi (Jews who came 
from Muslim countries) immigrants, who were settled in isolated frontier areas during 
the 1950s, they tell a repeating story about an arrival after darkness and a refusal to 
get off the trucks and busses.72  
The ma’abara was constructed out of tents which were later replaced with timber huts 
and was surrounded by barbed wire for protection. Food was supplied every few days 
and water was brought from the adjacent well. Similar to other ma’abara camps, the 
camp had no electricity or sewage system and state services were poor: ‘in Tel-
Yeruham there is no phone and the nearest doctor is 53 kilometres away [...] garbage 
is collected once every two weeks’.73  ‘It was a deserted place’ tells S.L. who arrived 
to Yeruham camp as a child; ‘you could have died there – and no one would have 
known.’ (S.L., August 2012)   
While the poor conditions and spatial temporariness were difficulties common to all 
the ma’abara camps in Israel, the location of Yeruham in the rough and remote desert 
frontier was experienced as particularly difficult:  
‘They put people here like in a cage. The desert was the bars of the cage. Some 
eventually succeeded not to see the bars and to feel at home. But some couldn’t, 
so they left.’ (A.B., April 2013)  
It was not easy for the immigrants, however, to leave the frontier camps; after 
inhabitants tried to move to more central camps, the authorities adopted radical 
measures such as preventing the reallocation of work permits and food rationing 
cards, which were essential in that period, to immigrants who relocated without 
permission, coercing them to stay in their isolated and remote camp.74 Such relocation 
approvals, however, were difficult to obtain; in October 1951 over 2,000 families 
requested the Jewish Agency to permit their relocation from frontier ma’abara camps, 
but only five percent received a positive response.75 
While the main purpose of the ma’abara camps was to absorb the Jewish immigrants 
and to disperse them to frontier territories, another main objective of the ma’abara 
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was to induct the immigrants into the labour force; the inhabitants had to work. Relief 
projects provided by the government, however, which were based on manual labour, 
were often the only way the immigrants in the frontier camps could earn their living, 
entailing dependency of the ma’abara dwellers in the authorities and a process of 
proletarization.76 The state also saw manual labour as an educational and ideological 
mechanism: ‘we consider manual work not only the most important contribution to 
the construction of our country, but also a step towards the formation of a new Jewish 
man and character’.77 The frontier ma’abara camps, therefore, which forced the 
immigrants to change their occupation according to the demands of the new state, 
were also used as an educational mechanism, forcing  
In order to understand the significant function of Yeruham and other ma’abara 
camps, it is important to look at them as biopolitical instruments which allowed the 
state to manage the immigrants separately from the veteran Israeli society. This 
instrument enabled to force the immigrants, as people with the ‘right’ Jewish identity,  
to occupy the frontier, while compelling them to transform their foreign character and 
become ‘appropriate’ proletariat Israeli citizens. However, because the ma’abara 
camps were erected as only temporary tools, although the immigrants were coerced 
into occupying Yeruham camp ‘in the institutions there was no plan to develop the 
place. They saw it as a transitory place which will eventually vanish’.78 The ma’abara 
camps indeed enabled the state to quickly absorb and disperse the immigrants, and 
then to suspend them in space and time in the frontier, until the ‘development towns’ 
– small modern-designed towns planned mostly in remote regions – were planned and 
constructed.79  The planners were not bothered by the poor physical conditions in the 
camps; any additional investment, in their opinion, might simply prolong their 
existence and turn them into slums.80 Yeruham’s second ma’abara erected in 1962, 
reflects even more faithfully the instrumentality of camp planning; its repetitive 
prefabricated huts were rigidly and densely placed in a grid at the margins of the 
marginal settlement, providing a temporary and highly controlled shelter, creating a 
blunt, binary spatial pattern. 
The unequal power relations in the camps which made the immigrants dependent on 
the institutions in all aspects of life, the spatial and geographical separation of the 
ma’abara camps from the predominantly Ashkenazi (European Jews) veteran society, 
and the fact that, among the ma’abara dwellers, Mizrahi (Eastern) Jews formed the 
majority – have generated a process in which the Jewish Israeli society became 
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ethnically divided.81 A strong ideology has justified this inequality, presenting 
modernism as part of an advanced culture required for the creation of a new 
developed nation, while negating the Mizrahi culture as underdeveloped and 
primitive.82 This negation of an entire population was in essence their 
dehumanisation;83 this population was perceived as a material to be moulded and used 
for state interests. This ethnic discrimination was built up deliberately, many scholars 
argue,84 showing that the ‘development towns’ like Yeruham – initially formed by the 
frontier ma’abara camps and later becoming the poorest and most dependant towns in 
the country – served as an instrument for social engineering that lead to the extreme 
current ethnic segregation in Israel.  
While the Zionist discourse presents the ma’abara camps as improvised, transitory 
spaces erected following the necessities of mass-immigration, it is clear that the well-
being of the immigrants was not the priority of the institutions. The camps had a 
crucial territorial, social, economical and biopolitical role in the newly established 
modern state. It forcefully manipulated the immigrants, excluded them from the 
veteran Israeli society and suspended their status as autonomous subjects, while using 
them as peons in the state’s struggle over the frontier.85  
Expelling and concentrating: Rachme and the unrecognised Bedouin 
settlements86  
Rachme [Illustrations 17-18] is a Bedouin village of about 1,200 people which is 
currently unrecognised by the Israeli government, located on the north-east and 
western outskirts of Yeruham, mostly within the town’s municipal border. Before 
Israel’s establishment, the Sawahana Bedouin tribe used the lands in the area for 
pasture. Most of this tribe fled to Jordan and Egypt following the establishment of the 
state in 1948, while the minority remained in the area and based their livelihood on 
herds and seasonal agriculture. Today, however, most of Rachme’s families are of the 
Sarachin tribe. They were transferred to the area by the Israeli army during the 
martial rule at the late 1950s, from an area closer to the Israeli-Egyptian border.87 
Yeruham camp was created in the area during the same period and within a decade 
was developed into a town, however Rachme was never recognised by the Israeli 
authorities. 
Rachme’s houses are makeshift structures made out of light and cheap materials such 
as timber frame, plastic sheets, corrugated steel and re-used building parts. The 
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houses are not connected to infrastructures; there are no paved roads, sewers, or 
garbage collection system, electricity is mostly supplied by solar panels and mobile 
phones are used for communication [Illustrations 19-22]. For basic state services such 
as health and post Rachme residents visit Yeruham, while older children attend school 
thirty kilometres away in the neighbouring Bedouin local council. Rachme residents 
are denied any legal right to inhabit the land, even though some of them lived in the 
area before Israel was established, and most having been transferred there by the state. 
Currently declared ‘invaders’, with their houses considered illegal, the residents of 
Rachme are under a constant threat of demolition by the state who is pressuring them 
to move into a designated town. A ‘building freeze’ policy is being enforced since 
2009, and the authorities are preventing any new builds: 88  
‘Today […] you can’t even build a hut. They immediately destroy it. It is awful. 
Even if your house is destroyed because of bad weather – they won’t allow you 
to fix it... they use a lot of force so we can’t resist. They take you to prison. 
Sometimes [when there are house demolitions] – they have a bus full of 
policeman waiting by the main road.’89 
‘Today it is impossible to build, to extend. They look down here from the 
satellites – and that’s it [...] All these house demolitions... so many of them… 
they came with a large number of police and demolished his [the neighbour’s] 
house... like we are in Gaza! So many soldiers came – it was a total mess. And 
for what? I have never seen any state in the world which acts like this to its own 
citizens. Why? It creates a very bad feeling. A man serves thirty years in the 
Israeli Defence Force and then they demolish his house. They came and 
demolished everything. Everything. They came with tractors, their special units, 
soldiers. They are doing too many horrible things... they push you into a corner.90 
While being deprived of any “life supporting” mechanisms such as economic 
resources, infrastructures or state services, the residents of Rachme are at the same 
time exposed to direct state violence and being controlled by tight surveillance. 
Rachme, however, is not an exception. After the 1948 war, the Israeli policy 
regarding the fractions of tribes that remained in the Negev was based on two basic 
practices: their concentration in a limited geographical area known as the Siyag 
(fence) under martial law,91 where any permanent construction was forbidden, and the 
declaration of all the land in the Negev as unregistered, which therefore belongs to the 
state. Although the Negev Bedouin became a sedentary and territorial society before 
Israel’s establishment, increasingly relying on rain-fed agriculture for their 
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livelihood,92 most did not register their land during Ottoman and British rule,93 a legal 
fact which allowed executing the Israeli land policy. A Zionist cultural-political 
vision, in which the Negev desert is a deserted area which is yet to be redeemed while 
the Negev Bedouin represent a disappearing primitive culture, guided this policy.94  
With the end of the martial rule in 1966, the state continued to manage the Bedouins 
through an administrative patchwork of exclusive systems outside the normal juridical 
and governmental order that used the law selectively. Ever-changing governmental 
bodies comprised this special apparatus such as the ‘Authority for the Development of 
the Bedouin’, the ‘Authority for the Regularization of the Bedouin Settlement in the 
Negev’ and the ‘Green Patrol’, a government policing body in charge of reserving 
state lands.95 These bodies used a range of pressure tactics to coerce this indigenous 
population into concentrating in seven purpose-built townships that were established 
since the late 1960s and to which Israel had hoped to transfer all the Bedouins, 
uprooting them from their land and turning them into city dwellers.96  For Rachme 
residents, similar to many of the Bedouins, concentrating in a town would mean 
giving up their entire way of life, from their everyday livelihood to their basic cultural 
needs: 
‘We need an area for agriculture. They can’t put us in town and say – there you 
are – now you have to live here. We have goats, camels – that’s how we make 
our living... it will be very difficult to move to a different place.’ (S.Z. April 
2013)  
Today the 200,000 Negev Bedouin are composed of three main sub-groups: those 
urbanised into the townships (around 60%), those living in their ancestral land 
(mostly in unrecognised localities) and those evicted from their original lands and 
transferred into a new area where they live in unrecognised settlements, like most of 
Rachme’s residents.97 Today, over forty unrecognised Bedouin localities are 
struggling for legal recognition by the Israeli government while being suspended in an 
intermediate situation: on the one hand they do not receive state provision for basic 
needs because they are illegal, and on the other hand the state cannot evict them 
without their agreement. 98  
‘Villages’, ‘encampments’ or P’zura (scattering), is how the unrecognised Bedouin 
settlements are named by different political bodies. While ‘villages’ reflects a more 
permanent spatiality, ‘encampment’ and ‘scattering’ implies a nomadic context, with 
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temporariness which is culturally imbedded. However what seems to be a 
spontaneous and independent form of settlement are de facto camps, which, similar to 
other provisional makeshift camps around the world, were built by their own dwellers 
with their temporary status enforced by the state authorities. Rather than being 
chaotic, the spaces of Rachme reflect the deep social and cultural Bedouin traditions 
according to which they are built and developed; the cloisters in the camp follow the 
divisions of the nuclear and extended family and tribal divisions, and the makeshift 
houses themselves are built according to traditional spatial organisations and patterns. 
Their spatial temporariness, however, is enforced by the state.  
These camps are naturalised by the state as part of the Bedouins’ past nomadic 
culture, while their inhabitants are abandoned outside the normal order, with their 
traditional sources of livelihood constantly diminishing together with their territory.99 
The current ‘building freeze’, accompanied by heavy surveillance and house 
demolition, deeply constrains the Bedouin space, affecting their everyday lives, 
including the postponement of marriages and houses becoming overcrowded with 
children. The biopolitical mechanism of the camp, therefore, enables Israel to suspend 
the Bedouins outside the spatial, legal and governmental order until they surrender to 
the demand and move into their designated space, giving up their land and their 
traditional way of life, as part of Israel’s efforts to de-Arabise its territory.  
The durable reality of dislocation followed by institutionalised suspended 
temporariness is a systematic Israeli policy which was not inflicted only on the Negev 
Bedouin. Many camps created by the internally displaced Palestinian population were 
also denied government recognition, infrastructures and services. This group was also 
banished from sight, history and future after loosing their original homes following 
the 1948 war, and became ‘phantom people dwelling on ghostly ground’.100 Similar to 
other Negev Bedouins and to camp dwellers elsewhere, Rachme residents still 
struggle against their oppression ‘through ‘producing spaces’ both physically and 
politically’.101 These radical spatial actions and counter-actions related to the camp, 
which are sometimes lawless, make an integral part of the ongoing struggles over the 
frontier. 
Between Expansion and Exclusion: the Versatile Mechanism of the Common 
Camp 
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Israel’s ‘camp legacy’ was and still is very strong. Camps mentioned here expose the 
multifaceted yet common role of the camp in re-shaping and manipulating the lands 
and populations of Israel-Palestine. This variety of camp types is not coincidental but 
relates to political and territorial logics which correspond to the very basic conditions 
of modern biopolitics, functioning in different ways as mechanisms of control in the 
service of nationalistic and state-building enterprises. However, the development of 
camp spaces over the years has been influenced by various factors that do not always 
work according to the interests of the state which initially created them. This 
complexity, manifested in the two very different examples of Yeruham and Rachme, 
shows that Agamben’s theory of the camp is not sufficient. The camp cannot be 
analysed only as a dehumanising space of bare life, but also appears as a temporary 
flexible platform where spatio-political actions of struggle and resistance may be 
conducted and where new political subjectivities can emerge.  
Yeruham and Rachme are two very different examples of the camp. Their 
temporariness endured for different time periods. Their populations are of different 
ethnicities: Yeruham’s being Jewish immigrants originating from various countries, 
desired by the state, albeit in a conditioned way, while Rachme’s Bedouin-Arabs were 
rejected by the state due to their ethnicity. The spaces of these two camps were 
created and developed by various methods and actors. In addition, the populations of 
these two camps have very different relations to their surroundings – the Jewish 
immigrants were completely alien while the Bedouin are indigenous to the area. 
Nevertheless, in both of these settlements the basic mechanism of the camp has a very 
similar purpose: both camps were created to manage, suspend, manipulate and change 
the character of specific populations for the sake of the nationalistic project to build 
the modern Israeli state and nation in a very specific image. While the Bedouin were 
supposed to be transformed into an ‘urban proletariat’ which ‘would not live on [its] 
land with [its] herds’,102 Jewish immigrants were supposed to be transformed through 
‘manual labour’ from diaspora Jews with traditional ‘Jewish occupations’ into ‘a new 
Jewish man and character’.103 Both of these camps’ inhabitants function as the human 
‘raw material’ in the process of an inevitable change. The differences between 
Yeruham and Rachme allow one to see the way various types of camp served in 
various ways as the physical in-between space one had to be suspended in order to be 
moulded according to the needs of the ‘national machine’; to become part of a strong 
modern nation or to be suspended away from it.  
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The different camps I have studied indeed show multiple perspectives which expose 
the varied spatialities and functions of the camp, but in the end this research can be 
crystallised in four main arguments about the camp:  
The first argument is that the mechanism of the camp serves as a multifaceted spatio-
political tool which is prevalently used in Israel-Palestine to separately manage 
different populations in territory. Although this mechanism has varied spatial 
manifestations, it has distinct common characteristics which make it a device that is 
closely related to the creation and function of the modern state and to the way the 
nation-state-territory triad is modified in it. 
The second argument makes a claim about the camp that goes beyond its common 
understanding as a ‘space of exclusion’, contending that the camp is used for two 
complementary territorial purposes: one is indeed territorial exclusion, while the other 
is territorial expansion.104 While this dual role of the camp is tightly connected to the 
formation and development of Israeli space in particular, it is deeply rooted in 
colonial history. Furthermore, this new conceptualisation of the camp allows it to be 
examined as a complex territorial instrument which belongs to the variety of radical 
spatio-political practices.  
The third argument is related to the multifaceted spatial characteristics of the camp, 
claiming that the camp’s spatiality is an outcome of the various powerful forces which 
influence its creation and alternation. While the camp’s ‘ordered’ layout hides a very 
‘thin’ violent order, the camp’s ‘chaotic’ layout is in fact an expression of a much 
deeper cultural order.  
In line with these findings, the fourth argument maintains that the camp is not only an 
Agambenian space of de-subjectivation and thanatopolitics105 where people are 
stripped of their humanity, but can also be a space were new political subjectivities 
emerge through the way inhabitants negotiate, cooperate and strive to change a 
political reality through their own spatial and political resourcefulness.  
Governed by the same frontier mentality of the state involving fierce control 
alongside legal, material and social abandonment, Yeruham and Rachme are 
distinctive yet complementary examples of camps, each exhibiting the same defining 
characteristics together with different spatial manifestations and territorial uses. While 
their differences allow the versatile forms and roles of the camp to be explored, their 
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unique political initiatives106  serve as an additional example which refutes the idea of 
the camp being only about ‘bare life’. These four main arguments will add to a new 
perspective on the camp, exposing it as a mechanism of radical spatio-political 
changes which facilitates varied territorial and demographic alternations, while 
sometimes being in itself a flexible tool which allows the emergence of new political 
practices.   
The Instrument of the Camp 
Camps, as we have seen throughout this research, take various forms and have various 
purposes. Nevertheless, they all share specific characteristics which enable them to be 
perceived as a distinct spatial mechanism. First, the camp is created and managed as a 
temporary space,107 although its temporariness may linger for decades. In Yeruham 
and Rachme we have seen very different examples of this spatial temporariness, in 
aspects of the camps’ materiality, territorial objectives and durability. Yeruham was 
created by the state and its related Jewish institutions as a temporary camp, 
constructed from modern pre-fabricated units (tents and huts), as part of a project to 
spread Jewish immigrants to frontier territories and suspend them there until the 
‘national plan’ and its ‘development towns’ were ready.108  Rachme was also created 
as a temporary arrangement by Bedouin transferred to the area by the army. However, 
while Yeruham was stabilised long ago in the form of an Israeli town, Rachme 
Bedouin were and still are suspended in their self-built makeshift settlement until they 
agree to concentrate further. While these examples of spatial temporariness are very 
different in their form and purpose, they both show the role of the camp as a space 
erected ad hoc to answer an urgent territorial need, only to later be suspended as an 
in-between space until a permanent spatial arrangement is achieved, usually according 
to the interests of the state. It is important to mention that both Yeruham and Rachme 
residents objected to their temporary status at different times, as a continuous state of 
temporariness takes power from the subjects and transfers it to the sovereign and its 
arbitrary and ever-changing decisions.109    
The second characteristic is that the camp is a space created and managed in a specific 
mode of governance outside the state’s normal juridical order.110 Both Yeruham and 
Rachme were created in the ‘emergency years’ of Israel’s early statehood and were 
managed by specific bodies which were not part of the state’s regular governing 
institutions. Rachme was first created by the Israeli army and managed under martial 
law, and was later controlled by various bodies such as the Bedouin Authority and the 
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‘green patrol’, while Yeruham was created and managed by the Jewish Agency. These 
modes of governance, working outside the democratic state order, often involve 
increased use of violence as part of their control methods. It is important to note that 
neither Yeruham nor Rachme were unique one-off camp spaces but were both part of 
encompassing camp schemes and policies: Yeruham was part of the ma’abarot project 
while Rachme was formed in a similar way to other unrecognised Bedouin villages, 
and like them it is still  managed according to ever-changing state policies. These 
closed camp systems function as spatial and juridical archipelagos within the state.    
This leads us to the third characteristic of a camp as a space created by or for specific 
populations.111 Whether created by or for immigrants, Bedouin, refugees or settlers, 
camps are inhabited by people with a specific ethnic, cultural, political or other 
distinguished identity: either one inherent to a population, like ‘Bedouin’, or an 
‘external’ identity defined according to their specific situation, like ‘immigrants’. 
Yeruham was created for, and inhabited by, Jewish immigrants from various 
countries, mostly from what was seen as Mizrahi origin, while Rachme’s residents are 
all Negev Bedouin. The camp overrides similarities and differences: it overrides 
similarities between the camp’s inhabitants and the ‘normal’ citizens outside, and it 
overrides differences among the people within the camp, who are treated en masse 
according to a one-dimensional identity. One of the main differences between 
Rachme and a traditional Bedouin encampment is that its residents belong to more 
than one tribal group. Likewise, the immigrants brought to Yeruham camp originated 
from a variety of African and Asian countries, but they were concentrated there under 
the unifying label of Mizrahi immigrants. Thus, the camp may impose on its residents 
a simplistic identity based on prejudice and ignorance, ignoring cultural, traditional 
and other crucial differences between its individual inhabitants and thus stripping 
them of their humanity, turning them into a group of anonymous, identical and easy to 
manage people.   
These three salient characteristics of the camp relate to the functional nexus of the 
modern nation-state,112 and to the way the state/subjects/space triad is recalibrated in 
it:113 the camp’s spatial temporariness relates to land (territory), its existence and 
control outside regular state laws and institutions relate to its specific mode of 
governance (state) and its specific population relates to life managed within the state 
(nation). As we have seen in Yeruham and Rachme, the camp is used to achieve the 
‘maximum overlap’ between the state’s territory and its desired nation, facilitating the 
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expansion of the state by spreading one population (Jewish immigrants) and 
concentrating and suspending the other (the Negev Bedouin).  
The decision over who will be included and protected within the state order and who 
excluded is the central task of modern biopolitics.114 Rachme is indeed excluded from 
the Israeli/Jewish national body, its population abandoned by the hegemonic state 
order: it was left with no life-support system, shrinking traditional sources of living 
and no alternative economic resources, while its residents are exposed to violent state 
action. Rachme’s residents were also disconnected from their previous tribal body, 
most of which was expelled or escaped to Sinai and Jordan after the 1948 war. In 
Yeruham camp, as in other frontier ma’abarot camps, the (mainly Mizrahi) 
immigrants were also suspended outside the state’s order in a desolate area, 
disconnected from their previous communities and places of origin. In both cases, the 
two different populations were excluded from the central state order and disconnected 
from their previous communities. In both cases, the camp’s population was to be 
included within the state order under certain conditions and with certain reservations, 
only after a process of cultural assimilation, i.e. modernisation, was completed, and 
the state’s ethnocratic nomos enforced.  
The camp is therefore a spatial tool of segregation and separation, the prevalent 
approach of Israeli authorities, both socially and spatially, towards different 
populations,115 especially Jews and Arabs. While territorial and spatio-ethnic 
segregation is a common phenomenon in world history,116 Israel’s active role in 
generating segregation was inscribed in the Zionist movement’s basic ambition: to 
establish a nation-state for the Jewish people in a country inhabited by an Arab 
majority.117 In this manner, the camp continues the legacy of other projects of colonial 
segregation and separation according to ethnicity, functioning as a device of 
biopolitical ordering which facilitates the sovereign decision over who is in, who is 
out and who is suspended for decades.  
Camps are enclaves within the state’s territory, and their separation mechanism is 
used in two complementary ways. First, they force a specific population to stay in a 
specific location, thus separating them from the rest of their society, as when 
immigrants were made to stay in Yeruham or the Bedouin compelled to stay in the 
Siyag zone. Second, the camp separates its inhabitants from their immediate 
surroundings, whether it is the landscape or the various populations around them. It is 
not a coincidence that, while Yeruham was surrounded by a real barbed wire fence, 
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the area designated for Bedouin in the days of martial law was called the Siyag (the 
fence).  
The camp is a space which disciplines the movement of people; however, it is not 
limited to administering only movement across national boundaries,118 but also works 
within them, enforcing the spread or concentration of specific populations. The camp 
is therefore created in relation to mobility and the force applied to facilitate or prevent 
it. The prevention of motion, and in our case also its enforcement, often requires 
direct, unmediated violence, which is another characteristic inherent to camp spaces, 
where, frequently, ‘power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation’.119  
As an instrument of dynamic and radical spatial changes and interventions, the camp 
often functions as a space of the frontier. Contested frontiers, such as various parts of 
the Negev at different times, are not well-balanced places of exchange but are 
destinations for territorial penetration and expansion that ‘incorporate the breakdown 
of laws and institutions’.120 As places to be tamed, frontiers are highly controlled and 
controlling, but their embedded lawlessness, which is sometimes accompanied or 
substituted by an intentionally-created ordered-disorder,121 is not only subject to 
increased control and surveillance, but is also used as a tool by the different sides.  
Despite their significant differences, the common characteristics of the camp which 
Yeruham and Rachme share show that they are both part of the same distinct spatio-
political mechanism connected to the formation of the modern nation-state: they were 
(and Rachme still is) temporary spaces; they were created and function as enclavic 
spaces of separation outside the state’s normal juridical and governmental order; and 
they were created for or by specific populations. As instruments of territorial struggle, 
these camps are spaces related to enforced mobility and violence, conditions which 
are also related to the struggle over the frontier, where indigenous and new 
populations fight to control the land. 
Spaces of Exclusion, Spaces of Expansion: The Territorial Roles of the Camp 
Understanding the varied spatial manifestations of the camp as part of one 
multifaceted spatio-political mechanism allows us to identify this spatial entity in all 
of its various forms and functions. However, there is still a need to define the ways it 
is used as a versatile instrument to facilitate radical geopolitical change. Here, I wish 
to present a perspective on the camp which goes beyond the Agambenian theory and 
 24 
its related discussions, suggesting a new conceptual framework to examine its 
complex territorial role in Israel-Palestine and beyond.  
       Camps of exclusion  
Agamben’s theory of sovereign power and the state/space of exception, presented in 
his Homo sacer trilogy,122 analyses the camp – where, by its exclusion, ‘bare life’ is 
included in the state territory and political order – as the centre of modern 
(bio)politics. The Agambenian camp is a biopolitical machine where people are 
transformed into exposed biological bodies, a space of thanatopolitics historically 
related to the concentration camps of late 19th century colonial wars,123 incarnated in 
Europe in Nazi concentration camps and linked to the actual or metaphorical camp 
spaces of today, created each time the state of exception is materialised.124 Thus, 
Agamben reduces the very general notion of ‘the camp’ to a very specific theoretical, 
spatial and geopolitical meaning as a ‘space of exclusion’, grounded in a particular 
historical perspective.   
We have already seen that the camp has various political and territorial uses which are 
much broader than the exclusion of unwanted populations. While Rachme can indeed 
be analysed as a space of exception and exclusion, the interpretation of Yeruham and 
the other frontier ma’abarot camps, whose one of its main national role was to expand 
the Jewish population across the territory, requires a different approach. This 
approach, I argue, is also deeply grounded in colonial history, which is reflected in the 
early stages of the Zionist settlement in Palestine, when camps were not used for 
territorial exclusion but for territorial expansion. 
       Camps of expansion 
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt examines the central role played by 
European imperial expansion in the development of totalitarianism. Arendt writes 
about the dichotomy between expansionism and the principles of the nation-state, 
explaining that expansion, as the central political idea of imperialism, could not bring 
national laws with it and impose them on other peoples. ‘The inner contradiction 
between the nation’s body politic and conquest as a political device,’ writes Arendt, 
‘has been obvious since the failure of the Napoleonic dream’.125 Indeed, colonial 
expansion, as history tells us, leads quickly to exclusion, creating a ‘laboratory of 
modernity’, where new forms of power mechanisms, including the camp, were tested 
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within the colonial matrix. However, the camp, I suggest, had a crucial role long 
before it was used as a ‘space of exclusion’ to violently enclose weak populations 
chased by colonial occupiers, as described by Agamben. This role is inherent to 
colonial expansion itself as an immediate means of penetrating and inhabiting frontier 
territories. While the ‘camp of exclusion’ enabled populations to be excluded within 
colonial and later national territory, the ‘camp of expansion’ allowed the territory to 
be penetrated in the first place, and later facilitated territorial control over it. 
Historically speaking, colonial ‘camps of expansion’ preceded ‘camps of exclusion’; 
only after the settlers arrived and settled in the new country were ‘camps of exclusion’ 
invented to concentrate the resisting locals. This points to a symbiotic, 
complementary relation between expansion and exclusion, with one action often 
leading to the other.  
Similarly to the camps of ancient Rome, which sometimes became civic 
settlements,126 many colonial settlements also began as provisional outpost camps, or 
as what Paul Gilroy calls ‘fortified encampments of the colonizers’.127 These fortified 
frontier camps, such as the improvised Spanish military nuclei in Río de la Plata, 
today’s Argentina, later developed into cities like Buenos Aires. These provisional 
fortified frontier camps were the best response to the constantly changing colonial 
boundaries: they could be rapidly built in strategic places in order to secure the 
conquered territory and then easily abandoned when occupation was advanced to new 
areas.128 The Australian ‘settler camps’, created in the late 19th century by/for 
European settlers and later deserted and wiped off the map or becoming permanent 
settlements, are another example of how the camp was used as an instrument of 
colonial expansion and settlement [Illustration 25]. But while in Australia these camps 
are currently studied as archaeological remnants,129 in Israel-Palestine they were and 
still are used as an active territorial instrument.    
       Camps of expansion in Israel-Palestine 
Camps and temporary architecture were used by Zionist settlers from the early days of 
Zionist settlement. The first Zionist communal settlements were composed of small 
agricultural groups of young pioneers who tended to work and erect tent camps in 
remote, desolate and temporary locations.130 Tents were the first dwelling units in 
Degania, the first kibbutz, and in Beit-Hashita kibbutz two timber huts and a few tents 
served the settlers for the first ten years.131 Timber huts were gradually constructed in 
those kibbutzim which settled in a specific place, although these were mainly public 
 26 
structures. This form of settlement also seemed to suit the basic principles adopted by 
the kibbutz movement of frugality, equality and rejection of private property, a 
mixture of ‘Tolstoyan ideas about closeness to nature, with the addition of Marxist 
revolutionary fervour’.132  
In Land and Desire in Early Zionism, Boaz Neuman shows the intense relations of 
desire which blurred the boundaries between the land and the pioneer ‘who moistens 
the soil and senses himself as part of it’.133 However, this action also created 
boundaries: ‘the pioneer moistens the land, thus making it “Jewish”, constituting a 
boundary between Jewish land and Arab land’.134 Neuman argues that the pioneers’ 
desire for the land ‘allows us to see the pioneer-Zionist act not only as political, 
economic, ideological, historical, or religious but first and foremost as existential’:135 
‘through labor, the halutzim [pioneers] “unite” and “merge” with the land, are 
“assimilated” and “soaked up” by it’.136 
It could be argued that the tent-camps allowed an unmediated relation between the 
pioneers and the soil, an almost physical connection with the land, to develop. In 
addition, as many of the first pioneer groups moved their camps frequently, to 
wherever they could find work, the physical temporariness of the tent-camps, the fact 
that they could be easily moved to different locations, meant that a specific temporary 
space could potentially occupy other spaces almost simultaneously and that the 
pioneers were potentially everywhere – in many spaces at the same time. Thus, one 
group of people in a camp potentially occupied a much larger territory than it actually 
occupied at a specific moment. As the agricultural and building activity of the 
pioneers changed the land itself, and their temporary camps meant that they could 
easily move in space, this spatial temporariness meant that they could leave as many 
marks as possible, until the land was fully occupied and ‘owned’ through its 
cultivation.  
This form of temporary camp was enhanced, improved and changed during the pre-
state, early-state and later periods, becoming more and more territorial. One of the 
most famous types is the ‘Tower and Stockade’ method, adopted during the Arab 
Revolt, which allowed the construction of several pre-fabricated fortified kibbutz-
camps in one day. These civic settler camps, of which more than fifty were erected in 
three years, used military tactics in their design and construction, and significantly 
changed the map of Jewish settlements in Palestine. Interestingly, the way Yeruham 
was first erected was compared to this frontier settlement mode.137 
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Similar to pre-state settler camps, the Nahal camps (the Hebrew initials for ‘pioneer 
combatant youth’), initiated by Ben-Gurion in the first year of statehood, also blurred 
the distinction between security needs and territorial settlement objectives [Illustration 
26]. Each Nahal camp was called He’ahzut (Hebrew for ‘holding on tightly’), and 
combined military service with the creation of new agricultural frontier settlements. 
The soldiers in a Nahal group erected a camp ‘in an area too exposed, dangerous or 
difficult for normal civilian habitation’, and at the end of three years’ military service 
the Nahal group became civilian;138 either the soldiers remained there to live their 
civilian life or other civilians arrived to replace them.139 More than 90 such camps 
were created between 1950 and 1980 in frontier areas like the Arava region, the Sinai 
Peninsula and the Golan Heights, many of which eventually became permanent 
kibbutz and moshav settlements. In accordance with the semi-military character of 
these ‘camps of expansion’, their surroundings were perceived as a potential threat 
against which protection was needed – either through a stockade or barbed wire – and 
always with weapons. Thus, while other types of camp are used to exclude specific 
populations from society, these ‘camps of expansion’ excluded themselves from their 
surroundings, which were still not entirely in their control, while creating a sequence 
of settlements which redefined the territory. In addition, while violence is usually 
inflicted on the inmates/dwellers of other camps, the ‘camps of expansion’ produce 
violence in relation to their exterior by their invasive territorial actions. 
In Barbed Wire – an Ecology of Modernity, Reviel Netz describes two very different 
yet complementary control mechanisms from early modernity – the mass-produced 
blockhouse and the concentration camp – both invented by the British colonial 
powers in South Africa in their fight against the Boers at the turn of the 20th century. 
These two mechanisms used barbed wire in its two alternative spatial roles – to 
prevent motion from the outside and to prevent motion to the outside.  
The blockhouse of the Boer War was a mass-produced and rapidly erected fort used to 
protect British railroad infrastructure from Boer guerrilla fighters. These small guard 
posts were placed along the railroads, which were also fenced by barbed wire, 
enabling an area to be controlled with the minimum manpower.140 This mechanism is 
similar in its principles to the fortified ‘Tower and Stockade’ camps, which were also 
built a relatively short distance from one another and were eventually ‘transformed 
into total Israeli control over the land as a whole’.141 In his work on settlements and 
outposts in the West Bank, Ariel Handel also shows how the system of connected 
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fortified Jewish settlement ‘points’ is used to divide and better control the Palestinian 
landscape;142 as these outposts are mainly located on hilltops, they enable vast spatial 
control over their surroundings [Illustration 27].143 ‘Look how absurd it is, the issue of 
timber forts’, says Shlomo Gur, the architect of the ‘Tower and Stockade’ camps 64 
years after their ‘invention’; ‘All the Wild West is made out of it. The outposts of the 
barbaric Americans who went to the Indians’ territories were all built in the shape of 
[fortified] wooden cloisters with towers’.144    
Thus, these rapidly erected camps/outposts facilitated the movement of settlers to the 
frontier, their control over it and their territorial expansion as a whole. It is not 
coincidental that many of the frontier ma’abarot camps, including Yeruham, were also 
protected by barbed wire, as they were used for territorial expansion in a similar way. 
Concentration camps also appeared during the Boer War with the opposite spatial 
role, in which barbed wire was used to confine a population in order to ‘protect’ a 
specific territory from them [Illustration 28]. The threatening ‘outside’ was enclaved 
and surrounded by barbed wire – its barbs this time pointing inside – coercing people 
into a specific controlled area, making them ‘passive recipients of violence’.145 
       The ma’abarot camps: a hybrid of expansion and exclusion 
The early closed ‘immigrant camps’ were first conceived as a useful mechanism, as a 
form combining custody and care in order to control, order, support and absorb the 
masses of immigrants who it was planned would come to the country as part of a 
rescue project combined with state-building and nation-building projects.146 These 
camps were similar to other models for refugee and internally displaced person [IDP] 
camps designed for the separation of immigrants from the rest of the civic population 
in order to support and control them before they became part of their new society. 
British military camps built in pre-state Mandatory Palestine were viewed as the best 
spaces for such camps as, like all military camps, they allowed many to be 
accommodated in a relatively small space with maximum control. When during the 
first years of the state it became clear that this model was not working for financial, 
political and territorial reasons, the familiar ‘settler camp’ model was adjusted to its 
new mass-use. Combining the Zionist established expansionist values of ‘conquering 
the frontier’ and ‘redeeming the land’ with government-arranged manual labour, it 
also allowed the ma’abara camps to be created on a smaller scale so as to control and 
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order immigrants, who were strangers to the established and mostly Ashkenazi Israeli 
society.  
Thus, we can say that the ma’abarot camps were a kind of hybrid of ‘immigrant 
camps’ and the earlier Zionist ‘settler camps’, combining camps which controlled 
people with camps which control the land. Ma’abarot camps were a combination of 
‘camps of expansion’ and ‘camps of exclusion’: the Israeli government invited 
immigrants to Israel, arranging their transportation to and absorption in their new state 
so as to enhance Israel’s image as ‘the ingathering of exiles’, its demographic power 
and its territorial abilities, yet they excluded these people and their form of life once 
they got there. Immigrants were excluded from their home countries because they had 
emigrated, but were again excluded from Israeli society and resources, despite their 
role in forming Israel’s image, territory, economy and military power. 147   
In combining the two types of camp, the ma’abarot seems to be a unique spatial 
phenomenon, an Israeli invention which enabled the modern Israeli project to be 
realised. It is worth asking to what extent the frontier ma’abarot camps did the job for 
which they were created. Did these camps in isolated locations and the people sent to 
them actually make a difference, contributing to Israel’s territorial strength? If so, was 
the social and personal price worth it? Did it actually help to forcefully spread the 
Jewish population by settling people on the frontier, or was the superficial 
demographic-territorial balance merely an excuse for intra-Jewish racial separation? 
The answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this paper. However, defining 
‘camps of expansion’ as being complementary in their objectives and functions to 
Agamben’s ‘camps of exclusion’ and understanding ma’abarot camps as a hybrid of 
both types enables us to better understand the varied roles played by the camp 
throughout its history and in the radical changes made to the lands and populations of 
Israel-Palestine. 
The Multifaceted Spatiality of the Camp and its Meaning 
The identification and definition of camps of ‘expansion’ and ‘exclusion’ has enabled 
us to examine the camp as a versatile tool which facilitates territorial reformations and 
biopolitical ordering in distinct yet complementary manners. However, within these 
distinctions there is still a crucial need to understand the multifaceted spatialities of 
the camp. After all, the camp is not a mere technology but is a space in itself, the 
varied forms of which are not only linked to its function in the state’s modern spatial 
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apparatus but also to the camp’s own unique characteristics and the way it is variously 
created, used and altered. Within each category there are camps with very different 
spatialities – for example ‘camps of exclusion’ include both rigidly-built detention 
camps and self-built makeshift refugee camps with a very different spatial formation. 
Thus, the multifaceted spatialities of the camp are clearly not directly related to these 
categories, meaning that there is a need to analyse them separately. 
The camps of Yeruham and Rachme not only play the complementary territorial roles 
of expansion and exclusion, but also represent almost completely contrasting 
architectural types, which enable us to examine their meaning. Yeruham’s two camps 
were rigid spaces formed of repetitive structures placed in a functional and rational 
order. Rachme’s spatiality is inherently different; at first glance it looks arbitrary and 
chaotic, yet this informal appearance is built according to specific cultural rules 
reflecting a form of deep order. 
The extreme rigid and chaotic spatialities of Yeruham and Rachme seem to reflect the 
respective control and abandonment of the camp dwellers: while the rigidity of 
Yeruham suggests that camp dwellers were subject to strict and total control by the 
state, the chaos of Rachme suggests complete abandonment of the inhabitants. The 
reality, however, is more complex; both Yeruham and Rachme were exposed to 
radical relations with the state involving both control and abandonment, which 
together with additional factors created their very different spaces.  
       Deciphering the multifaceted spatialities of the camp 
The three salient characteristics of the camp which distinguish it from the hegemonic 
built environment are spatial temporariness, a specific mode of governance and a 
specific population. However, how these characteristics are manifested varies 
between camps. The way camp spaces are formed, managed and altered is crucially 
influenced by the duration and nature of their temporary status, the character of their 
legal exclusion and the characteristics of the specific population suspended in them, 
whether it is a genuine ethnic identity such as ‘Bedouin’ or people from several ethnic 
backgrounds unified by an external definition such as ‘immigrants’.    
The Yeruham camps were initially erected as rigid spaces of repetitive pre-fabricated 
units placed in a rational order, either in a dense grid or according to topography. 
Behind this order stands an institutional instrumental thinking which adopted the most 
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efficient way to place temporary structures in order to save money, ensure the camp’s 
temporariness and create an ordered space which was easy to control and manage. 
The rigid form of Yeruham camps is similar not only to other ma’abarot camps but 
also to other familiar repetitive camp types, an efficient layout which can be traced in 
the earlier settings of refugee camps, detention camps, settler camps and others in 
Israel-Palestine and worldwide. This is a typical space of modernity in its total design 
and order which attempts to eliminate in two ways the chaotic reality that followed 
national reordering and state creation: the first way is to re-organise the Israeli 
territory itself by spreading the Jewish population in it, and the other way is by the 
creation of total order in the space of the camp itself, allowing it to be easily erected 
and managed. ‘We can say that existence is modern’ says Bauman, ‘as far as it is 
effected and sustained by design, manipulation, management, engineering’;148 the 
ma’abarot camps, and Yeruham among them, are spaces of modernity both in relation 
to their internal instrumental design, organization and management and in facilitating 
the organization of the Israeli space as a whole.  
Besides minor spatial actions by camp dwellers, the spatial form of the camps in 
Yeruham did not change significantly during their several years of existence for 
various reasons. The camps existed for only a few years, after which their inhabitants 
were moved into permanent housing. Opportunities for changing them were thus 
limited. In addition, immigrants in the Yeruham camps were completely dependent on 
state institutions and could therefore only minimally accommodate the camps to their 
needs: they did not have access to local building materials (except for mud, with 
which they built outdoor ovens) and the camp was completely controlled by the 
Jewish Agency, which also owned the huts, possibly forbidding changes to them. 
Another point is that camps and the later development town were formed according to 
the state’s modernist ideology aimed at erasing the cultural traditions of the 
immigrants, who in many cases made an effort to assimilate to their new state’s 
culture, trying to accommodate to their given space rather than changing it.  
The rigid repetitive modern template itself possibly also had an intimidating effect; 
the standard anonymous huts left no ‘loose ends’ to be differently accommodated and 
utilised, creating an order which resisted any stamp of individuality. If we compare 
these rigid camps to other high-modernist projects such as James Holston’s work on 
Brasília,149 it is possible to assume that this systematic rationality of architectural 
uniformity with no visual and sensory differences was alien to the immigrants, many 
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of whom came from vivid urban environments in Asia and North Africa. The total 
order, legible to planners and administrators, may have been experienced as a 
confusingly repetitive environment of indistinguishable units with no distinctive 
landmark, creating problems of orientation for the residents,150 or what Scott called 
‘mystifying disorder’.151 But one of the most important factors which probably 
affected the immigrants’ ability to alter the camp was the fact that they were a 
‘shocked population’.152 Immigrants were taken away from everything familiar, and 
this rupture within their own life made them incapable of changing their new lives.  
As we have already established, although it looks as if Rachme’s makeshift houses are 
assembled and scattered across the landscape with no apparent order, its ‘chaotic’ 
spatiality is actually organised according to specific Bedouin cultural and social 
traditions and customs, constrained by limitations imposed by the Israeli authorities. 
In contrast to Yeruham, Rachme was not only created by its own dwellers, who were 
indigenous to the area, but it has also existed for many decades, changing over the 
years for a variety of reasons, such as natural population growth and ongoing changes 
in its form of life. The camp’s houses, constructed and developed according to 
traditions and modernisation processes specific to the Bedouin, were altered over time 
through the use of varied materials and building methods according to changing needs 
and available resources [Illustration 24]. These changes and adaptations were and still 
are violently restricted by the state, which also enforces the camp’s temporary status 
and restricts resources such as land, while abandoning the Bedouin with no or 
minimal services or connection to infrastructure. As a space of enforced 
temporariness, the spatiality of the camp often forms part of the resistance to this 
enduring temporary situation. This spatial resistance takes many forms; while the 
Bedouin use the building of houses to force the state to acknowledge their camps and 
villages, Palestinians use the space of their refugee camps in various ways to resist 
Israeli occupation with the aim of changing the political situation of the Palestinians 
as a whole.153  
As with any built environment, factors related to the location of the camp, such as 
climate, topography, natural resources and proximity to other built environments may 
have significant influence on its spatiality, as can factors related to scale and size. The 
ma’abarot camps themselves differed substantially in their location and scale, as well 
as in the services and public institutions they possessed, such as schools and 
synagogues. Another significant factor influencing the spatiality of the camp is the 
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nature of their basic structures, whether they are tents, huts or barracks. The relation 
between private and public also differs between camps; in some there is no private or 
family space and inhabitants are completely exposed in their most intimate moments, 
affecting both the level of control in them and the human identity of those who live 
there.  
Thus, the rigid order of Yeruham’s camps was in fact a very ‘thin’ order covering the 
violent disorder of immigrants’ lives in their new location, where they inhabited a 
strange and confusing ‘total order’ in a desolate desert landscape together with others 
from different countries and cultures. In contrast, behind Rachme’s chaotic disorder it 
is possible to identify a deep spatial order, based on a traditional cultural and social 
order. These ‘ordered’ and ‘chaotic’ spatialities reach such extremes due to the 
extreme and violent modes of governance of control and abandonment in the camp. 
We may return here to Zygmunt Bauman’s theory of modernity’s violent quest for 
order and its dialectic relations with chaos and disorder,154 or we can use the words of 
poet Wallace Stevens, who expresses this accurately in Connoisseur of Chaos:155  
A. A violent order is a disorder; and 
B. A great disorder is an order. These 
Two things are one. 
As we have seen, the form a camp takes is dependent on a combination of multiple 
factors according to which it is created, changed and managed by the sovereign and/or 
by its inhabitants. Once created ad hoc as a temporary space, the camp evolves in 
different ways, creating different spatialities, all included in the category of the camp, 
and it changes according to the capacities of the inhabitants, not just those of the 
sovereign. Rendering these different spatialities as one abstract entity limits 
understanding not only of the spaces of the camps themselves but also of their 
complex and changing political role. There is a need, therefore, not only to discuss 
‘the camp’ in general but also to discuss particular camps, and understand their 
changing roles in their particular historical and geopolitical contexts.  
From ‘Bare Life’ to ‘Everyday Life’ 
The analytical approach Minca offers for the camp156 is in line with other critical 
scholarly work on refugee, transit and detention camps created by sovereign powers, 
which, based on Agamben’s writings, analyse the camp as a site that transforms 
people into mere biopolitical bodies.157 However, a growing scholarly literature based 
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on empirical studies of different camp spaces has developed a different theoretical 
approach which criticises the Agambenian generalisation of the camp, arguing that 
Agamben’s theory of the camp does not provide an appropriate analytical tool for 
understanding the complexity of social and political relations in the camp, proposing 
that camps be analysed as political spaces of struggle and contestation and of human 
agency. 
For example, in her work on an informal migrant camp in Calais, Kim Rygiel158 
analyses the camp as a social and political lived space in which people ‘on the move’ 
negotiate, cooperate, fight, resist and practice citizenship through their own 
resourcefulness. In her study of informalised refugee camps in the Middle East and 
South Asia, Romola Sanyal159 shows how people recover their political power by 
spatial actions.160 Adam Ramadan analyses Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon161 
as spaces of agency and struggle, arguing that ‘[i]f we accept a formulaic Agambenian 
reading of the camp as a space of exception in which political life is suspended, then 
[…] acts of resistance and struggle might be rendered outside politics, as silent 
expressions of bare life or illegitimate acts of terrorism’.162 Nando Sigona proposes 
the concept of ‘campzenship’ to capture the specific form of political membership 
produced in and by the camp, acting as ‘a social and political terrain where rights, 
entitlements and obligations are reshaped, bended, adjusted, neglected and activated 
by and through everyday interactions’.163  
Similarly, many of the camps discussed throughout this dissertation which were built 
and altered by their own dwellers were used at different levels as instruments for their 
political, national, cultural and territorial struggles. The ‘pioneer’ settler camps used 
for Zionist national expansion or Bedouin camps, some of which are still being used 
as instruments of territorial and political struggle, are two very different examples of 
the camp being used as a political instrument which begins a new political order or 
resists an existing one, and not only through the forceful manipulation of certain 
populations by others.  
Michel de Certeau’s famous perspective on the practice of everyday life164 is very 
visible in the camp. The usually ‘thin’, often rigid space of the camp’s initial layout 
makes it easy to identify the additional layers of the varied spatial alternations and 
contributions of its dwellers. By bringing to light ‘the clandestine forms taken by the 
dispersed, tactical, and makeshift creativity of groups or individuals already caught in 
the nets of “discipline” […which] compose the network of an antidiscipline’,165 de 
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Certeau detects not only the poetic but also the political dimension of everyday 
practices. The creation of space in the camp does not need to have a pure political or 
territorial purpose in order to be political; as the camp is by its very existence a 
political space, every space created in it for the most basic needs of everyday life is 
always already political.166  
It is important to distinguish here between the major and minor uses of the camp as a 
political device and the architecture related to these uses. These terms are borrowed 
from Deleuze and Guattari’s vocabulary, initially presented in A Thousand 
Plateaus167 and developed in their book on ‘minor literature’.168 While for them 
majority implies a state of domination, not in a manner of quantity but of quality,169 
minoritarian (not to be confused with minority) is a state of becoming or a process, 
involving deterritorialisation of the characteristics of the majority. This process 
implies two simultaneous movements: a withdrawal from the majority and a rise from 
the minority: ‘[b]ecoming-minoritarian is a political affair and necessitates a labor of 
power (puissance), an active micropolitics. This is the opposite of macropolitics […] 
in which it is a question of knowing how to win or obtain a majority’.170 As Jill Stoner 
writes, ‘A minor architecture is political because it is mobilized from below, from 
substrata that may not even register in the sanctioned operations of the profession’.171 
The camp is often a tool of the majority, used by it to expand or exclude, to gain or 
maintain political power. However, camps may also be the platform or the instrument 
for a minor micropolitics of becoming which changes and manipulates the 
architecture of the majority, whether they are camps created for refugees, indigenous 
minorities or immigrants and changed by them as in Rachme or the Palestinian 
refugee camps,172 or they are the makeshift migrant/refugee camps being erected 
today in the heart of cities.173  
Thus, it is clear that rather than being only ‘a political technology [….where] de-
subjectivation is made operational’,174 the camp increasingly appears, in this research 
as well as in other studies, as a complex space of major and minor political action and 
resistance, in which not only ‘bare life’ but also ‘everyday life’ is produced. While 
Agambenian theory is effective in analysing some coercive camp spaces, it seems that 
camps created and changed by their own inhabitants require a different analytical 
approach. 
Conclusion  
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As a control mechanism created for the expansion or exclusion of different 
populations in territory, the story of the camp is also the story of modernity and of 
how lands and people are utilised and classified with control over them concentrated 
in a few dominant centres. In this manner, the camp is also very much rooted in 
colonialism and nationalism and closely linked to settler societies, national creation 
and state building in the way that spaces and populations are controlled, managed, 
shifted and manipulated on a large scale for social engineering and biopolitical 
ordering – on local, regional and global levels. This is also why camps are so common 
in Israel-Palestine, being a crucial instrument of the constant geopolitical changes this 
contested territory has been through over the last century, changes which are 
inseparable from global geopolitical attitudes and events.  
The four main arguments established in this research, show that the multifaceted 
mechanism of the camp is a versatile spatial instrument which is used in many forms 
and by many actors, and is altered over time in relation to different periods, locations 
and populations. As we have seen, this tool, which combines space and action, 
movement and its restriction, is much more complex and multi-dimensional than that 
presented by Agamben. On the one hand, the main characteristics of the camp recur in 
all of its various forms, but on the other hand its varied manifestations and uses 
expose it as a mechanism that, similarly to its spatial role, is ever changing.  
As has been seen throughout the history of Israel-Palestine, camps are architectural entities 
inherently related to the movement of people in space: to its suspension and limitation, its 
facilitation, absorption and ordering. The story of the camp is the story of mobility and its 
restraint, of change and of the fear of change. Thus, the camp can be regarded as a shadow 
which constantly follows modern politics, as a space where people are dehumanised 
by other people; but it should also be looked at as a beam of light which indicates 
where new political subjectivities and changes may emerge. ‘The meaning of politics is 
freedom’,175 Hannah Arendt reminds us, arguing that it is ‘the freedom of movement’ which 
is ‘the substance and meaning of all things political’.176 While the movement Arendt refers to 
here is that of speech and its diversity, physical movement from place to place is also crucial 
to freedom. The camp, as a space which limits mobility and in other cases facilitates it, is a 
crucial mechanism related to the practices and policies of movement and thus of politics as a 
whole. In a world where the movement of people in-between spaces and territories is 
heavily supervised and restricted, and the ability to settle in a different place is 
dependent on what documents and money one possesses, camps signal a rupture in 
this tight order. Studying the camp therefore means studying changes as they 
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happened or currently happen, and its concrete manifestations may suggest the 
beginnings of new spatial and geopolitical orders that we still cannot fully imagine.   
Illustrations – please see PDF 
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